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An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under 
Risk 
 






We derive a simplified version of the model of Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 
2011] and show how this approximate model is useful in explaining choice under risk. 
We show that in the simple case of three outcomes, the model  can generate indifference 
curves that “fan out” in the Marshack-Machina triangle, and thus can explain the well-
known Allais and common ratio paradoxesthat models such as prospect theory and regret 
theory are designed to capture. At the same time, our model is consistent with modern 
macroeconomic theory and evidence and generates predictions across a much wider set of 
domains than these models.  
 
1. Introduction 
Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 2011, 2012] develop a model of costly self-control 
that can explain many ways that observed individual choice departs from the predictions 
of the “standard model” of maximizing expected discounted utility. Their self-control 
model is based on the idea that a more rational “long run self” controls the impulses of a 
“short  run  self”  that  is  very  tempted  by  immediate  rewards.
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2 While the model is intended as a very precise model of the internal processes underlying self-control, at a 
very rough level the model is consistent with fMRI evidence, since the “long run self” is identified with   2
[2006] points out that the self-control model can explain “time-domain” phenomena, such 
as a preference for commitment and time-inconsistent choice, and that when the model is 
enriched with the assumption of mental accounts or “pocket cash constraints” it can also 
explain the very high levels of small-stakes risk aversion seen in the lab, a quantitative 
puzzle that has become known as the Rabin paradox, after Rabin [2000].  Fudenberg and 
Levine [2011] show that the same model can also explain the interaction of risk and delay 
seen in such experiments as Baucells and Heukamp [2010] and Keren and Roelofsma 
[1995]. Moreover they move beyond the qualitative matching of theories and facts that is 
typical in this literature to a quantitative calibration of the model to both Rabin-paradox 
data and the Allais paradox.
3  
Unfortunately  the  model  of  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [2011]  is  fairly  complex, 
which may obscure some of the key insights and make it difficult for others to apply the 
model.  Our  purpose  here  it  to  develop  a  somewhat  simpler  approximation  to  the  FL 
model that is still accurate enough to be useful in applied work. After developing this 
approximation, we characterize its theoretical properties and show how it helps explain 
observed behavior in the Allais paradox and common ratio paradoxes and examine the 
implications of the theory for intransitivity.  
To study decision makers who act as if tempted by money winnings but also 
manage  to  save,  as  well  as  to  explain  the  level  of  risk  aversion  observed  in  lab 
experiments, Fudenberg and Levine [2006] use the idea of mental accounting: A decision 
maker reduces the cost of restraining impulsive decisions by using mental accounting to 
commit  to  daily  expenditures  –  the  idea  is  that  the  mental  account  is  set  when  the 
decision maker is in a “cool state” and not subject to temptation. By assumption, the 
commitment is to net expenditures, and not to consumption per se, so small losses must 
be born out of daily expenditures and small gains create a self-control problem. This 
results in the marginal propensity to consume out of small gains being large – one in 
                                                                                                                                                 
activation in the prefrontal cortex while the short run self corresponds to more primitive and faster-acting 
parts of the brain. See e.g. McClure et al. [2004, 2007] for fMRI evidence that support this general idea. 
3 One caveat is that the model described here, like Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 2011], assumes a short run 
self who lives only for a single period. For this reason the model, like quasi-hyperbolic discounting, implies 
that only the current period’s rewards are tempting. This stark conclusion is not suitable for analyzing some 
aspects of the timing of decisions, such as the marginal interest rates found in the experiment of Myerson 
and Green [1995]. A more realistic version of the model, in which short run selves are less patient than the 
long run self without being completely myopic, is developed in Fudenberg and Levine [2012].   3
fact.
4  Because small  losses and small gains are applied entirely to daily expenditures and 
not spread over the lifetime, the decision maker is much more risk averse over small 
unexpected lotteries than under the classical model, where any change in wealth results in 
a much smaller permanent change in consumption over the individual’s lifetime.  
A second consequence of this theory is that if there is an increasing marginal cost 
of self-control then the decision maker’s utility is not linear in probabilities and so this is 
not an expected utility theory. Moreover, while any form of nonlinearity makes the model 
depart  from  expected  utility,  the  increasing-marginal-cost  specification  predicts  the 
particular  violations  of  the  independence  axiom  seen  in,  for  example,  the  Allais, 
common-ratio and other related paradoxes, as detailed in Fudenberg and Levine [2011].  
Our goal here is to introduce a simple approximate version of the theory that can 
be used to study data on risk and lotteries. A key simplification is the assumption that the 
long-run value function is risk neutral, that is, that the marginal utility of savings is a 
constant. This is a good approximation to decisions that have little impact on lifetime 
wealth; it simplifies the model by replacing an unknown non-linear value function with a 
known linear value function. We also assume that the interest received over a single 
period (the “temptation horizon” of the short run self) is small enough to be ignored; this 
fits with the usual calibration of this period length to be one to three days.  We use the 
simplified model to explain how the theory ranks general small-stakes money lotteries, 
and illustrate this in the context of lotteries with only three possible outcomes in the gains 
domain  using  the  classic  Marschak-Machina  depiction  of  indifference  curves  in  the 
corresponding  probability  simplex.  We  also  illustrate  how  the  model  leads  to 
intransitivity. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we derive the approximate 
version of the dual-self model. In Section 3 we study its properties using a series of 
propositions. In Section 4 we examine the special case of a single gamble with a unique 
positive prize. Chapter 5 addresses the very interesting case of choices in menus of two 
lotteries, with three possible outcomes. We show how the model predicts well-known 
                                                 
4 This is consistent with psychological evidence that people need justification in order to spend money on 
“vices”, which offer short-term gratification but low long-term benefit (Kivetz and Zheng, 2006). Earning 
small  unexpected  amounts  provides  such  justification.  Accordingly,  people  will  tend  to  spend  these 
amounts immediately on temptation goods, which they would not otherwise purchase.    4
paradoxes  that  violate  expected  utility  and  illustrate  this  in  the  Marschak-Machina 
triangle. Chapter 6 provides a general discussion and concludes.  
2. Deriving an Approximate Dual-Self Model  
We will remind the reader of the main ingredients of the Fudenberg and Levine 
[2006, 2011] model, and then show how the approximation of risk neutrality for wealth 
leads to a much more tractable model. There is an individual who makes a consumption-
savings decision, with a short-run utility function  ( ; ) x u x c x +  each period, where x c +  
represents total consumption,  x  is the planned level of consumption under the mental 
account  (“pocket  cash”),  and  c   denotes  “incremental  consumption”:  the  additional 
(possibly negative if money is lost) consumption made possible by unexpected windfalls. 
When studying a fixed individual and holding fixed that individual’s initial wealth 
and preferences, we can suppress the dependence on  x  and take short-run utility to be 
( ) ( ; ) x u c u x c x = + , where  ' 0 u >  and  " 0 u < . In the remainder of the paper, the term 
“consumption” will refer to this incremental consumption. 
We are primarily interested in how the agent chooses lotteries  Z  from a fixed 
menu ℑ, where each of the lotteries resolves in the current period. For this, an important 
intermediate step is to analyze the agent’s optimal consumption ex post after a particular 
lottery has been chosen.
5  Let  * max ( ) Z u Eu Z ∈ℑ =  be the greatest available short-run 
utility. This “temptation” represents what the short-run self would like – to spend all the 
gains immediately. If the lottery Z  has n  outcomes, the choice of optimal consumption 
entails  choosing  an  optimal  random  consumption  plan  c ɶ  with  outcomes  1 ( ,..., ) n c c , 
specifying one consumption level for each possible lottery realization. Overall first period 
utility is given by  ( ) ( ) * ( ) Eu c g u Eu c − − ɶ ɶ  where g  is the cost of self-control. 
 In other words, current utility depends on current consumption and the cost of 
self-control, which is increasing in “foregone utility,” the difference between the utility 
the  “short-run  self”  would  have  liked  and  what  he  actually  got:  * ( ) u Eu c − ɶ .  For 
convenience,  we  define  the  argument  ( ) * Eu c u ∆ ≡ − ɶ ,  which  is  non-positive.  We 
assume  that  g   is  a  smooth,  non-decreasing,  weakly  convex  function  satisfying 
(0) 0, ( ) 0 g g = −∆ ≥ .  
                                                 
5 Notice that by assumption the self-control cost is incurred when the agent determines the consumption 
plan, so it depends on the expected utility of this plan.     5
The model of Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 2011] is not static, but considers an 
infinite horizon problem. It is well known that the recursive structure of the maximization 
problem allows us to represent future utility by means of a “value function” v , computed 
by optimizing beginning in period 2. This function has as its argument total wealth
6  2 w  at 
the beginning of the second period, which will be distributed optimally over the lifetime 
as consumption.  If the realization of the lottery is  i z  and consumption is  i i c z ≤  then the 
realized wealth beginning in period 2 is  2 i i w z c + − . The present value of utility starting 
in period 2 is  2 ( ) Ev w Z c + − ɶ . If δ is the discount factor, the overall objective function 
is 
(1)  2 2 ( , *, , ) ( ) ( * ( )) ( ) V c u Z w Eu c g u Eu c Ev w Z c δ = − − + + − ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ .  
Following  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [2006,  2011]  we  assume  that  the  lottery  is 
unanticipated.
7  Since pocket cash is chosen when the agent is not subject to temptation, 
the agent can obtain the optimal consumption path of someone who faces no self-control 
costs, without using any self-control. This is achieved by setting  0 c = : in this case 
absent  any  windfalls  the  agent  is  not  able  to  consume  more  than  the  first-best 
consumption level, and so faces no temptation to consume more. Hence  0 c =  is the 
optimal level, and so    2 '(0) '( ) u v w δ = . Define the function  ( ) ( ) h g ∆ ≡ ∆ − −∆ , the 
“self-control gain function”. This function is non-positive, smooth, strictly increasing, 
weakly concave function on  − ℜ  satisfying  '(0) 1 h ≥ . It inherits these properties from g . 
Also define 
 
(2)    ( )
* ( , , ) ( ) * '(0)( ) c U c u Z h Eu c u u EZ Ec = − + − ɶ ɶ ɶ .   
 
We will now approximate V for small gambles. Recall that  ( ) o y  denotes a function such 
that  0 lim ( )/ 0 y o y y → → , and that max | | Z  is the largest value in the support of | | Z .  
Lemma 1: The objective function satisfies the equality 
  * *
2 2 ( , , , ) ( , , ) * ( ) (max | |) c V c u Z w U c u Z u v w o Z δ = + + + ɶ ɶ . 
                                                 
6  Strictly  speaking  what  matters  is  not  total  wealth  and  consumption  but  discretionary  wealth  and 
consumption, that is, net of expenditures such as rent and medical care that are committed in advance and 
do not pose a temptation. 
7 Or that the probability is small enough not to have had an appreciable impact on the choice of pocket 
cash.   6
Proof:  Recall that  *
2 2 ( , , , ) ( ) ( * ( )) ( ) V c u Z w Eu c g u Eu c Ev w Z c δ = − − + + − ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ . Since 






{ ( ) '( )( ) (max | |)}
( ) '( )( ) (max | |)
Ev w Z c
E v w v w Z c o Z
v w v w EZ Ec o Z
+ − =






Substituting this and the definition of 
c U  into the objective function gives the desired 
result. 
￿ 
In comparison to Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 2011], this model assumes that no 
interest is paid on money found, earned, or saved during the first period, which fits with 
the idea that the length of a period is measured in days. Further, as an approximation, first 
period savings are assumed not to change the marginal present value of period two value. 
If  in  fact  savings  are  an  appreciable  portion  of  lifetime  wealth,  this  approximation 
understates risk aversion. 
Observe that for a given menu ℑ of lotteries  2 * ( ) u v w δ +  is a constant, and since 
the agent will pick the optimal consumption plan, for small  Z  the agent’s preferences 
over  lotteries  can  be  represented  by  the  approximate  objective  function 
( )
* max ( , , ) max [ ( ) * '(0)( )] c
c c U c u Z h Eu c u u EZ Ec = − + − ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ .  
Since consumption cannot exceed the amount earned by the prize, the problem is: 
choose  1 ( ,..., ) n c c c = ɶ  to maximize  ( ) ( ) * '(0)( ) h Eu c u u EZ Ec − + − ɶ ɶ  subject to the 
constraints  , 1,2,..., i i c z i n ≤ = . Define  
  { } ( ) { } ( *, , ) ( ) * max ( ) ( ),0 '(0) max ,0 U u Z z h Eu Z u E u Z u z u E Z z ≡ − − − + − . 
Theorem  2:  The  approximate  objective  function  * max ( , , ) c
cU c u Z ɶ ɶ   is  equal  to 
max ( *, , ) zU u Z z and  there is a threshold  ˆ z  such that if  ˆ i z z ≤  then  * i i c z =  (so all of 
the unexpected winnings are saved) while if  ˆ i z z ≥  then  ˆ * i c z =  (so any amount over  ˆ z  
is saved, regardless of the size of  i z .
8)   
Proof: Maximizing with respect to  i c  for a given realization of the lottery  i z , gives the 
consumption function  * c ɶ  as the implicit solution of 
                                                 
8 This stark conclusion comes from our simplifying assumption that the  marginal  utility of  savings  is 
constant, which is a good approximation only if the winnings are not in fact too large.    7
  ( ) '( *) ' ( *) * '(0) i u c h Eu c u u − ≥ ɶ   
with equality if  * i i c z < .
9  For any specification of c ɶ,  let  ˆ( ) z c ɶ  be the unique solution of  
  ( ) ˆ '( ( )) ' ( ) * '(0) u z c h Eu c u u − = ɶ ɶ    (*) 
in  ( , ] x − ∞ ,  where  we  assign  ˆ z = ∞   if  there  is  no  solution,  that  is,  if 
( ) ˆ '( ( )) ' ( ) * '(0) u z c h Eu c u u − > ɶ ɶ  for allˆ ( , ] z x ∈ − ∞ . Then we see that   * c ɶ  itself must 
have the property that if  ˆ i z z ≤  then  * i i c z = , while if  ˆ i z z ≥  then  ˆ * i c z = .   
Notice that the marginal propensity to consume out of income above the threshold 
is zero (this is a consequence of our approximation assumption). Thus  ˆ * min{ , } i i c z z = , 
and  therefore  ˆ ( *) min{ ( ), ( )} i Eu c E u z u z = ɶ   is  non-decreasing  in  ˆ z   and 
( ) ˆ '( ) ' ( *) * u z h Eu c u − ɶ   is  strictly  decreasing  in  ˆ z .  Notice  that  at  ˆ z x = −   we  have 
'( ) '( ( ) *) '(0) u x h u x u u − − − > ,  because  '( ) '(0) u x u − >   and  '( ( ) *) 1 h u x u − − ≥ .
10    
Our objective is to express the consumer’s preferences for lotteries in terms of this unique 
threshold.  Adding  and  subtracting  ( ) Eu Z   inside  of  h   and  using  the  linearity  of 
expectation we have: 
( ) ( *) * '(0)( *) h Eu c u u EZ Ec − + − = ɶ ɶ
( ) ( ) * ( ( ) ( *)) '(0) ( *) h Eu Z u E u Z u c u E Z c − − − + − ɶ ɶ . 
 
Using   ˆ * min{ , } i i c z z =  we see that  ˆ ( ) ( *) max{ ( ) ( ),0} u Z u c u Z u z − = − ɶ  and 
ˆ * max{ ,0} Z c Z z − = − ɶ . Substituting in gives the desired result.  
￿ 
3. Choice from Menus of Lotteries 
  We now suppose that the decision maker faces a menu  ℑof lotteries on [ , ] x y −  
where  , 0 x y >  and y  is “small” relative to lifetime wealth. As above, we suppose that 
the agent does not expect to face this menu.   
The approximate utility for opportunity set ℑ, threshold z  and lottery  0 Z ≥  is 
given by Theorem 2 as 
                                                 
9 Notice that the aforementioned condition is exactly the same for every  1,2,..., i n = .  Hence, if for two 
optimal  * * , i j c c  the constraint is  not binding (that is  * , * i i j j c z c z < < ) then it must be the case that 
* * i j c c = .  
10 This is because  '(0) 1 h ≥  and h is weakly concave.   8
  { } ( ) { } ( *, , ) ( ) * max ( ) ( ),0 '(0) max ,0 U u Z z h Eu Z u E u Z u z u E Z z = − − − + − . 
To reiterate, the first term h  represents the combination of utility received from 
immediate consumption and the cost of controlling the desire to spend even more. The 
second  term  represents  the  long-term  benefit  of  the  amount that  is  saved:  this is  not 
subject to a self-control problem, but is spread over the entire lifetime, and as indicated 
we approximate the corresponding risk as negligible so that the utility from savings is 
linear. 
Notice that in general the ranking of lotteries is menu dependent, as it depends not 
only on the lottery Z  that is being assessed, but also the utility  * u  from the lottery that 
yields the greatest short-run utility. This represents a temptation: spend all the money 
right away, and choose the lottery that maximizes the expected utility from doing so. 
However, when h  is linear the ranking does not depend on  * u . 
Properties of the Approximate Model 
The next result shows how to determine the value of the threshold ˆ z  above which 
all of the (unexpected) lottery payoff is saved.  
Proposition 3:   The  0 ˆ argmax ( *, , ) z U u Z z z ≥ ≡  is characterized by 
{ } ( ) ˆ ˆ ' ( ) * max ( ) ( ),0 '( ) '(0) h Eu Z u E u Z u z u z u − − − =  
which has a unique solution. If  '(0) 1 h >  then  ˆ 0 z > .  ( *, , ) U u Z z  is differentiable with 
respect to z  at  ˆ z z =  and the derivative is zero. The function  
  { } ( ) ( , ) ' ( ) * max ( ) ( ),0 '( ) F Z z h Eu Z u E u Z u z u z = − − −  
is strictly decreasing  in z  with left and right derivatives both bounded away from zero. 
Proof:  The  expression  follows  from  plugging  the  solution  ˆ * min{ , } i i c z z =   into  the 
necessary first order condition (*). The uniqueness of the solution follows from the fact 
that the LHS is strictly decreasing. If  '(0) 1 h >  then since  ' h  is decreasing, it follows 
that the solution satisfies  ˆ '( ) '(0) u z u <  which in turn implies ˆ 0 z > .  
  To see that  ( *, , ) U u Z z   is differentiable with respect to z  at  ˆ z z =  we compute 
that its derivative is equal to zero. Observe first that  ( *, , ) U u Z i  is certainly differentiable 
unless  ˆ i z z =  for some  i and regardless, the left and right derivatives exist. We will   9
complete the proof by showing both are equal to zero at  ˆ z z = . The derivative has the 
form 
  { } ( ) { }
{ }
( *, , )/
[ ' ( ) * max ( ) ( ),0 max ( ) ( ),0 /
'(0) max ,0 / ]
i i i
i
U u Z z z
p h Eu Z u E u Z u z u z u z z
u z z z
∂ ∂ =
− − − − ∂ − ∂
+ ∂ − ∂
∑  
where the derivative of the max is understood to depend on the direction if  i z z = . The 
key observation is that each individual term in the sum vanishes at  ˆ z z = . If  i z z <  this 
is immediate since near z  the term does not depend on z . The same is true if  i z z =  for 
the right-hand side derivative. When  i z z >  the term is 
  { } ( ) ' ( ) * max ( ) ( ),0 '( ) '(0) h Eu Z u E u Z u z u z u − − − − +  
which vanishes at  ˆ z  by the earlier characterization of  ˆ z . The same applies when  i z z =  
in the negative direction. 
  The properties of  ( , ) F Z z  may be established by differentiating with respect to z . 
￿ 
Proposition 4: If h  is linear then the decision-maker ranks lotteries according to 
{ } { } '(0)min ( ), ( ) '(0)max ,0 L L E h u z u Z u Z z   + −      
where  L z  is the unique solution of  '( ) '(0)/ '(0) L u z u h = . 
Proof: In this case the objective function is 
  { } ( ) { } ˆ ˆ (0) '(0) ( ) * max ( ) ( ),0 '(0) max ,0 h h Eu Z u E u Z u z u E Z z + − − − + − . 
Discarding  the  irrelevant  constant  term  (0) '(0) * h h u − ,  and  observing  that 
{ } ˆ ˆ ( ) max ( ) ( ),0 min{ ( ), ( )} Eu Z E u Z u z E u z u Z − − =  gives the expression for ranking 
lotteries. Substituting into (*) and solving gives the solution for  L z . 
￿ 
In  addition  to  menu  independence,  Proposition  4  shows  that  in  the  linear  case  the 
independence axiom is satisfied: lotteries are ranked according to an expected utility and 
the weak axiom of revealed preference is satisfied. However, the linear model cannot 
explain choices such as the common ratio or Allais paradox that violate the independence 
axiom, nor can it explain the interaction of risk and delay (Baucells and Heukamp, 2010; 
Keren and Roelofsma, 1995), or the “compromise effect” (Simonson, 1989).    10
Even when h  is not linear, the preferences still correspond to an expected utility 
theory on particular pairs of lotteries, namely those with “all small outcomes” and those 
all of whose outcomes are large. The next two propositions say this formally:  
Proposition 5. Define  C z  as the unique solution of  ( ) ' ( ) * '( ) '(0) C C h u z u u z u − = . 
Then  C L z z ≥  and for all Z ∈ ℑ we have  0 argmax ( *, , ) C
z U u Z z z ≥ ≥ . Moreover, if 
all Z C z ≥  then  0 argmax ( *, , ) C
z U u Z z z ≥ =  and lotteries are ranked according toEZ . 
Proof:  Uniqueness  follows  from  strict  monotonicity  of  the  LHS  of  the  expression; 
C L z z ≥  follows from the fact that ( ) * C u z u − , the argument of  ' h , is non-positive.  
Plugging  the  solution  ˆ * min{ , } i i c z z =   into  (*)  we  have  
( ) ˆ ˆ ' min{ ( ), ( )} * '( ) '(0) h E u z u Z u u z u − = . Observe also that  ˆ ˆ min{ ( ), ( )} ( ) u z u Z u z ≤  
so  that  ( ) ˆ ˆ ' ( ) * '( ) '(0) h u z u u z u − ≤   and  thus  ˆ C z z ≤ .  Finally,  if  all  Z C z ≥   then 
min{ ( ), ( )} ( ) C C u z u Z u z = , so  ( ) ' min{ ( ), ( )} * '( ) '(0) C C h E u z u Z u u z u − =  meaning 
that  the  first  order  condition  is  satisfied.  Then,  Proposition  3  implies  that 
0 argmax ( *, , ) C
z U u Z z z ≥ = ,  and  plugging  back  into  the  objective  function,  we  get 
( ) max ( *, , ) ( ) * '(0) ( ) C C
zU u Z z h u z u u E Z z = − + − , which is increasing in EZ . 
￿ 
In other words, the decision-maker is risk neutral with respect to relatively large positive 
lotteries. 
Proposition 6: If  L Z z ≤  for all Z ∈ ℑ then lotteries are ranked according to ( ) Eu Z . 
Proof: Observe that  ˆ L z z ≥  since the argument in  ' h  of Proposition 3 is non-positive. 
Hence  L Z z ≤   implies  ˆ Z z ≤   and  so  the  objective  function  may  be  written  as 
( ) ˆ ( *, , ) ( ) * U u Z z h Eu Z u = −  from which the result follows. 
￿ 
In  other  words  the  decision  maker  uses  the  short-run  utility  function  to  evaluate 
sufficiently small lotteries. 
  The suggestion of these results is that if h  is strictly concave rather than linear, 
then for lotteries with outcomes that do not lie entirely above the cutoff  C z  or entirely 
below the cutoff  L z  the theory need not be an expected utility theory, and so may exhibit 
reversals such as those exhibited in the Allais or common ratio paradoxes.  
Proposition 7: Preferences over lotteries are consistent with stochastic dominance.   11
Proof: Quiggin [1989] has shown that one lottery first order stochastically dominates 
another if and only if the lotteries can be realized as random variables on a common 
probability space, such that every realization of the dominant lottery is at least as great as 
the corresponding realization of the dominated lottery. Hence it is sufficient to consider 
whether  utility  is  non-decreasing  in  the  vector  of  values  of  Z .  Since  the  objective 
function  is  ( ) { } ( *, , ) min{ ( ), ( )} * '(0) max ,0 U u Z z h E u Z u z u u E Z z = − + − ,  and 
this is non-decreasing in the vector of values of Z , the same is true for max ( *, , ) zU u Z z . 
￿ 
 
In other words, our model predicts that people will tend to choose a lottery that is “clearly 
better” than another (dominated) lottery. “Better” is in the sense that any given monetary 
payoff is offered with at least as high probability as in the dominated lottery. 
 
4. Found Money 
A key role in the analysis is played by the cutoff  L z , which is the solution to 
'( ) '(0)/ '(0) L u z u h = .  To  get  an  idea  of  how  this  cutoff  works,  it  is  interesting  to 
examine  the  simplest  possible  decision  problem:  that  of  found  money.  Here  ℑ  is  a 
singleton containing a single lottery that delivers a certain amountζ . This can correspond 
to finding the amount ζ on the street. While in standard theory such gains will be spread 
over the entire lifetime, here when the amount is small, that is, less than the cutoff  L z , it 
will all be spent. Although this sounds like the description of the threshold  ˆ z , the cutoff 
L z  is different, and we will try to explain why.  
When the agent finds money ζ  the temptation is to spend all of it, so  * ( ) u u ζ = . 
If the amount found is small, then the approximation we have introduced is valid, and the 
agent will choose consumption c to maximize 
* ( , , ) c U c u z = ɶ ɶ   ( ) ( ) ( ) * '(0)( ) ( ) ( ) '(0)( ) h u c u u c h u c u u c ζ ζ ζ − + − = − + − .    12
The corresponding first order condition is  '( ( ) ( )) '( ) '(0) h u c u u c u ζ − ≥  with equality if 
c ζ < . Notice that the threshold  ˆ z  is defined by  ˆ ˆ '( ( ) ( )) '( ) '(0) h u z u u z u ζ − = , so it 
depends on the earned amount ζ .  
  Now we use an example to illustrate the role of the cutoff  L z , which, unlike  ˆ z , 
does not depend on  ζ . Assume logarithmic utility  ( ) log( ) u c x c = + , where  x  is the 
exogenously  given  pocket  cash,  and  also  that  ( ) exp( ) h A γ ∆ = − − ∆   with  1 A ≥ , 
1 γ ≥ . In this case,  '(0) 1/ u x = , and the objective function is 
   exp[ (log( ) log( ))] ( )/ A x x c c x γ ζ ζ − + − + + − = 
  [( )/( )] ( )/ A x x c c x γ ζ ζ − + + + − .  
Setting  the  derivative  of  this  with  respect  to  c   equal  to  zero  gives 
1 ( ) /( ) (1/ ) 0 A x x c x γ γ γ ζ + + + − = . It follows that the value of the threshold  ˆ z  for 
each value of ζ  is given by  1/( 1) ˆ [ ( ) ] z Ax x x γ γ γ ζ + = + − . This has slope 
    1/( 1) ˆ/ [ /( )] /( 1) 0 dz d Ax x γ ζ γ ζ γ γ + = + + > ,  
which is decreasing in  ζ . So the  ˆ( ) z ζ line is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly 
concave in ζ , and  1/( 1) ˆ(0) ( ) 0 z A x x γ γ + = − ≥ . 
Now  specialize  further  to  the  case  where  1 γ = ,  so  that 
ˆ (1 / ) z x A x x ζ = + − ,  with  ˆ/ / 2 (1 / ) dz d A x ζ ζ = + .  Notice  that  if  0 ζ = , 
ˆ ( 1) z x A = − .    Optimal  consumption  for  each  level  of  ζ   is  depicted  in  the  2-
dimensional plane in Figure 1. 
Remember that the role of the threshold ˆ z  is that if the realization of the lottery is 
higher  than  it,  then  consumption  is  ˆ z ,  but  if  the  realization  is  less  than  ˆ z ,  then 
consumption  is  equal  to  the  realization.  Here  since  the  lottery  is  deterministic,  the 
realization corresponding to ζ  is simply ζ . The  ˆ( ) z ζ line starts above zero, and it crosses 





ˆ z             ˆ z ζ =  
 
  ˆ (1 / ) z x A x x ζ = + −  
      
                                   
     ( 1) x A −  
 
 
                        ( 1) L z x A = −                                        ζ  
 
The  cutoff  point  ( 1) L z x A = − ,  where  it  crosses  this  line,  is  critical  for 
determining  consumption.  For  the  values  of  ζ   where  ˆ z ζ >   (at  the  left  of  L z )  the 
threshold is higher than  ζ  so optimal consumption is equal to  ζ . For the values of  ζ  
where  ˆ z ζ <  (at the right of  L z )  optimal consumption is equal to  the threshold  ˆ z . 
Accordingly, optimal consumption is given by the grey line in Figure 1. Finally, notice 
that  the  cutoff  satisfies  '( ( ) ( )) '( ) '(0) L L h u z u u z u ζ − = ,  and  L z ζ = ,  so  that 
indeed '( ) '(0)/ '(0) L u z u h = . Note in particular that in this case consumption goes to 
infinity as found money goes to infinity, even though the fraction that is spent goes to 
zero.  
Notice that in order to get a non-linear effect ζ  must go over the threshold of  L z , 
while on the other hand in order for the approximation to be accurate, ζ  must not be “too 
large.” Some computations show that this intermediate range of  ζ ’s is nonempty and 
useful.  
Notice that the error in the approximation is that of the linear approximation to the 
logarithm. In particular, if y  is the annual consumption flow, then the utility difference 
between the exact expected present value and the approximate one measured in units of 
an equivalent permanent change in annual income is bounded by  2 (1/2)( / ) y ζ . This does   14
not  depend  on  L z   or  any  of  the  non-linear  self-control  effects.  In  the  calibration  of 
Fudenberg and Levine [2006] y  is taken to be $15,000. Hence a  2500 ζ =  would result 
in an approximation error of no more than  1.4% while a  720 ζ =  would result in an 
approximation error of no more than 0.12%.  The former amount is the largest reward in 
the Kahenman and Tversky version of the Allais paradox. 
To put these number in perspective, the threshold  L z  calibrated in Fudenberg and 
Levine [2006] is nine times daily pocket cash of  $40, or  $360. Hence amounts in the 
range from $0 to twice the threshold, that is, $720, are subject to a significant non-linear 
effect, but result in an approximation error of at most 0.12%. 
The basic conclusion is that for amounts likely to been seen in experiments the 
approximation is extremely good, and independent of how h  and  L z  are chosen. Hence 
calibrations  of  h   and  L z   that  can  explain  non-linear  effects  in  experiments  do  not 
conflict with the approximation. 
   
5. Three-Outcome Gambles 
  To  better  understand  the  implications  of  self-control  preferences  for  choices 
among lotteries we examine lotteries with just three outcomes. This very simple case is 
sufficient to illustrate some of the best-known departures from expected utility theory, 
namely as the Allais paradox
11 and the common ratio effect
12 (Allais, 1953; Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). 
Assume that the possible lottery outcomes are  1 2 3 z z z < < , with probabilities 
1 2 3 , , p p p   and  corresponding  short-run  utilities  1 2 3 u u u < < ,  where 
( ), 1,2,3 i i u u z i = = . As is traditional for lotteries of this type, we will work in the 
                                                 
11 The paradox concerns choices between pairs of lotteries. We will remind readers of the original Allais 
experiment, which involves two choice scenarios. In Scenario I, Lottery  s  gives $1m (one million) with 
probability 1.00 and Lottery  r  gives $1m with probability 0.89, $5m with probability 0.10 and $0 with 
probability 0.01. In Scenario II, Lottery  ' s  gives $1m with probability 0.11 and $0 with probability 0.89 
and  Lottery  ' r   gives  $5m  with  probability  0.10  and  $0  with  probability  0.90.  Some  subjects  choose 
Lottery s  in Scenario I but Lottery  ' r  in Scenario II, which violates expected utility.  The Allais paradox 
is part of a more general effect, called the “common consequence” effect.  
12 In experiments of the common ratio effect, there is also choice among pairs of lotteries, where each 
lottery involves the zero outcome and either outcome A orB , where 0 A B < < . In Scenario 1, the small 
outcome (A) offered with a high probability (π ) is preferred over the large outcome (B ) with a low 
probability (ρ ).  However, when in Scenario 2 the probability for both positive outcomes is multiplied by 
the same number 0 1 ξ < < , the choice is reversed in favor of the lottery with the large outcome.       15
Marschak-Machina triangle: we take  2 1 3 1 p p p = − −  and plot  1 3 , p p . Machina [1987] 
illustrates how the above stated anomalies, which violate the expected utility benchmark, 
can be captured by indifference curves that “fan out”, or become steeper as one moves 
towards the northwest part of the triangle. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate and explain how 
fanning-out  curves  can  generate  the  Allais  paradox  and  the  common  ratio  effect 
(respectively). Our objective in this section is to show that indifference curves with these 
characteristics can also be generated by our simple model, which therefore captures these 
departures from expected utility.  
  For simplicity and because the Allais and common ratio paradoxes have this form, 
we  consider  only  the  gains  domain,  and  moreover  assume  that  the  worst  possible 
outcome is zero ( 1 0 z = ). We assume that  '(0) 1 h >  so that by Proposition 3  1 ˆ z z < .
13  
Also recall from Proposition 6 that if  3
L z z ≤  then preferences are just those of the 
short-run  self.  To  avoid  this  uninteresting  case  we  assume  that  3
L z z >   so  that  




                                                 
13 This highlights a special role of 0: it is less than the threshold  ˆ z  except in the non-self-control case 
where  '(0) 0 h = . 
14 To see that the latter inequality follows, note that if  3 ˆ z z ≤  then plugging in (*) would imply that 
ˆ L z z = , which entails a contradiction  to our assumption that  3
L z z > .    16
Figure 2. The Allais Paradox and Fanning-Out Curves 
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                                        Increasing  
                                            Utility       Scenario I concerns the choice between s and r, and s corresponds to a higher    
                indifference curve. Scenario II concerns the choice between s` and r`,                                                                                   
p3                                                                             and this time it is r` that corresponds to the higher indifference  
    curve. This is possible because the indifference curves become 
                                             steeper  as we move to the northwest of the triangle.  
                                    This generates the paradox: s in chosen in  
               r                                      r`                                                 Scenario I and  r` in scenario II. 
 
0   s                  p1                 s`                             1 
 
 
  Figure 3. The Common Ratio Paradox and Fanning-Out Curves 
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                                        Increasing  
                                            Utility 
                                                                              Scenario I concerns the choice between s and r and Scenario II concerns  
p3                                       r                                            the choice between s` and r`. The paradox involves the choice of s in   
                                                                                                                            scenario I and of  r` in scenario II. This is also captured  
                                  by indifference curves that “fan out”, as can  
  r`                          be seen in the triangle. 
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As  benchmarks,  consider  first  constant  expected value  curves  (those  of  a  risk 
neutral agent) so that indifference curves in the triangle are given by lines of the form 
3 3 2 1 2 1 ( ) ( ) p z z p z z k − − − = . As a second benchmark, consider indifference curves for 
the short-run self which are given by lines of the form 3 3 2 1 2 1 ( ) ( ) p u u p u u k − − − = . 
Because the short run self is risk averse, his indifference curves have a steeper slope than 
those of the risk neutral agent. 
  Turning  to  the  self-control  case,  we  will  consider  choices  between  pairs  of 
gambles, that is menus with two items,  1 3 1 3 ( , ), ( , ) p p p q q q = = , which we shall index 
{ , } k p q ∈ . The utility to the gamble p in the menu { , } p q  is given by  
  ( , ) max (max{ ( ), ( )}, , ) z p q p V p q U Eu Z Eu Z Z z ≡ . 
We  may  now  define  the  indifference  set  ( ) { | ( , ) ( , )} I p q V p q V q p ≡ =   and  the 
corresponding  indifference  relation  q p ∼   if  ( ) q I p ∈ .  Notice  that  this  relation  is 
reflexive  but  need  not  be  transitive.  To  understand  more  clearly  the  indifference  set, 
consider that it is defined implicitly by  
  max (max{ ( ), ( )}, , ) max (max{ ( ), ( )}, , ) 0 z p q p z p q q U Eu Z Eu Z Z z U Eu Z Eu Z Z z − = . 
We wish to examine the slope of this indifference set in the Marschak-Machina 
triangle. For this, we need to invoke the implicit function theorem and therefore need to 
show that this expression is continuously differentiable, at least in some neighborhood. 
The  key  fact  is  that  it  is  indeed  differentiable  with  respect  to  q   at  least  in  an  open 
neighborhood of q p =  and at all points where  ( ) ( ) p q Eu Z Eu Z ≠ . To see this, evaluate 
the utility difference at the optimal value of z , that is, ˆ ˆ , p q z z : 
  1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 ˆ ˆ ( , , *( , ), ( , ), ( , )) p q q q u q q z q q z q q Φ = ˆ ˆ ( *, , ) ( *, , ) p p q q U u Z z U u Z z − .  (2) 
We shall show that the indirect effects of a marginal change of q  through its effect on 
* u  and  ˆ ˆ , p q z z can be ignored (in a neighborhood of q p = ). First, the derivative of Φ  
with  respect  to  * u   is  zero  at  q p = ,  since 
ˆ ˆ ( *, , )/ * ( *, , )/ * | 0 p p q q q p dU u Z z du dU u Z z du = − = .  Second,  the  derivative  with 
respect to  ˆk z  is zero by Proposition 3.
15 Note that  ˆk z is implicitly determined by the 
                                                 
15  Note  that  now  we  need  to  ensure  that  * / du dq and  ˆ / k dz dq are  not  infinity  in  order  to  avoid  the 
indeterminate  form  0×∞.  It  is  clear  that  * / du dq < ∞ ,  but  we  now  need  to  make  sure  that 
ˆ / k dz dq < ∞ .    18
relation    ( , ) '(0) k k F Z z u =   from  Proposition  3.  The  function  F   is  differentiable  in 
, k p q =  by inspection and is strictly decreasing with left and right derivatives in  k z  
bounded away from zero by Proposition 3. Thus, the implicit function theorem applies to 
ˆk z  as a function of q , hence since  ˆk z   is determined optimally, the envelope theorem 
implies that we need consider only the derivative with respect to  q Z . This dependence is 
differentiable by inspection.    
In order for the indifference curves to fan out in such a manner that they explain 
the paradoxes, we need their slope to increase as we move towards the northwest of the 
triangle. We shall show that this is the case, because as we move in that direction the 
threshold ˆ z  increases. Intuitively we expect that higher  ˆ z  corresponds to a more difficult 
self-control  problem  and  that  this  should  result  in  preferences  –  that  is  slopes  of 
indifference curves – less like that of the long-run risk neutral self and more like the 
steeper sloped short-run indifference curves. This is verified by the next result.  
Proposition 8: The slope of  ( ) I p  at the point  q p = , denoted  ( ) S p , is positive and 
greater than the slope of risk neutral indifference curves. The slope depends on p only 
through ˆ z  and is increasing in ˆ z .
16 
Proof: It will be convenient to normalize so that 1 2 2 0, u u z = = . Then the slope of the 







We now compute the slope of the actual indifference curves at p, that is  ( ) S p  
First the expressions for  ˆ ( *, , ) q q U u Z z  may be written as  
{ } ( ) { }
ˆ ( *, , )
ˆ ˆ min ( ), ( ) * '(0) max ,0
q q
q q q q
U u Z z




{ } ( )
{ }
*
1 3 2 3
1 3 2 3 3
ˆ ˆ (1 )min ( ), ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ '(0)[(1 )max ,0 ( )].
q q
q q
h q q u z u z q u z u
u q q z z q z z
= − − + − +
− − − + −
 
From this we may compute   
                                                 
16  In particular, it can be written as a function  ˆ ( ) ( ( )) S p z p = Σ  where Σ  is strictly increasing in  ˆ z .   19
{ } ( ) { }
1 *
2 2
ˆ ( *, , )/ |
ˆ ˆ ˆ ' min ( ), ( ) * [min{ ( ), ( )}] '(0)[max ,0 ]
q q u
q q q q
U u Z z q
h E u Z u z u u z u z u z z
∂ ∂ =
− − − −
 
 
{ } { } ( )
*
2 1 3 2 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ min ( ), ( ) ' (1 )min ( ), ( ) ( ) q q q u z u z h q q u z u z q u z u = − − − + −  
{ } 2 ˆ '(0)(max ,0 ). q u z z − −
17 




ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( *, , )/ | ' min ( ), ( ) * [ ( ) min{ ( ), ( )}]
ˆ ˆ '(0)[ max ,0 ]
q q u q q q q
q q
U u Z z q h E u Z u z u u z u z u z
u z z z z
∂ ∂ = − −
+ − − −
 
Using  { } ( ) ˆ ˆ ' min ( ), ( ) * '( ) '(0) q q q h E u Z u z u u z u − =  we have the proportionality where 
the common factor  ˆ '(0)/ '( ) q u u z  omitted. 
{ } 1 * 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( *, , )/ | [min{ ( ), ( )}] '( )[max ,0 ] q q u q q q U u Z z q u z u z u z z z ∂ ∂ = − − −  
 
{ } 3 * 2 3 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( *, , )/ | [ ( ) min{ ( ), ( )}] '( )[ max ,0 ] q q u q q q q q U u Z z q u z u z u z u z z z z z ∂ ∂ = − + − − −
 
There are two cases.    
Case 1:  3 2 ˆ q z z z > >   
{ } 1 * 2 2
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( *, , )/ | [min{ ( ), ( )}] '( )[max ,0 ] q q u q q q U u Z z q u z u z u z z z
z
∂ ∂ = − − −
= −
 
  3 * 2 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( *, , )/ | [ ( ) ] '( )[ ] q q u q q q U u Z z q u z z u z z z ∂ ∂ = − + − . 






3 2 3 3
/
ˆ ˆ ˆ [ ( ) ] '( )[ ]
.





u z z u z z z
z
z z z u z u z z z
= =
− + −
− − − + −
 
This will be steeper than in the risk neutral case provided that  
  3 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) '( )[ ] q q q z u z u z z z − > − . 
                                                 
17  Notice  that  we  are  ignoring  the  partial  derivative  of  U  with  respect  to  * u   since  
* / 0 d du Φ =  at q p =  so that it will cancel out in the final computation of the slope. 
   20
Since  ˆ ˆ ( ) q q u z z <   it  follows  that  3 3 ˆ ˆ ( ) q q z u z z z − > − .  We  normalized  so  that 
1 2 2 0, u u z = =  and since  2 ˆ q z z >  it follows that  ˆ '( ) 1 q u z < . This gives the desired 
inequality. 




ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ {[ ( ) ] '( )[ ]}/ '( ) ''( )[ ] '( )
ˆ ˆ ''( )[ ] 0.
q q q q q q q q
q q
d u z z u z z z dz u z u z z z u z
u z z z
− + − = + − − =
− <
 
Thus, the indifference curves indeed get steeper as ˆ z  increases.  
Case  2:  2 ˆ q z z >   
  1 * 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( *, , )/ | ( ) '( )[ ] q q u q q q U u Z z q u z u z z z ∂ ∂ = − − −  
  3 * 3 2 ˆ ˆ ( *, , )/ | '( )[ ] q q u q U u Z z q u z z z ∂ ∂ = − . 










Since  2 ˆ q z z <  and  2 2 ( ) u z z =  by strict risk aversion  ˆ ˆ ( ) q q u z z > . Again using the mean 
value  theorem,  since  (0) 0 u = and  by  strict  risk  aversion,  it  follows  that 
ˆ ˆ ˆ '( ) ( ) q q q u z z u z < . This implies slope steeper than risk neutral. 
 




3 2 3 2
ˆ ( )
ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )/ '( ) '( )
q
q
q q q q q
u z
z z
z z u z u z u z z
z z z z







ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ [ ( )/ '( )]/ 1 1 ( ) ''( )/[ '( )]
ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ''( )/[ '( )] 0.
q q q q q q q
q q q
d z u z u z dz u z u z u z
u z u z u z
− + = − + − =
− >
 
This gives the desired result. 
￿ 
Now that we have shown that the slope is increasing in  ˆ z , we need to examine 
how  ˆ z   behaves  as  3 p   increases  and  1 p   decreases  (as  we  move  in  the  northwest 
direction). In the following, we will be evaluating ˆ z   at the point where p q = .     21
 
Proposition 9: The  ˆp z (corresponding to the singleton menu{ } p )  is increasing in  3 p , 
and there is a critical value  3 ˆ p  such that if  3 p 3 ˆ p ≤ then  ˆp z  is decreasing in  1 p , while if 
3 p 3 ˆ p >  then ˆp z  is independent of  1 p . 
 
Proof: We work with the alternative version of the condition defining ˆ z  
  ( ) ˆ ˆ ' min{ ( ), ( )} * '( ) '(0) p p p h E u Z u z u u z u − = . 
Writing that out in terms of  1 3 , p p  we get 
( ) 1 3 2 3 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ ' (1 )min{0, ( ) } min{0, ( ) } '( ) '(0) p p p h p p u z z p u z u u z u − − − + − = .  (**) 
  First we examine the dependence of ˆp z  on  3 p . Differentiating (**) with respect to 
3 p  we find  
  ( )
( )
1 3 2 3 3
3 2
ˆ ˆ '' (1 )min{0, ( ) } min{0, ( ) }
ˆ ˆ ˆ min{0, ( ) } min{0, ( ) } '( ) 0.
p p
p p p
h p p u z z p u z u
u z u u z z u z
− − − + −
× − − − ≥
 
The inequality follows from the fact that  3 2 2 u z u > =  and is strict since  3 ˆp z z < . Since 
the derivative of (**) is negative with respect to  ˆp z  (by Proposition 3) we can apply the 











Finally, we consider the derivative with respect to  1 p . We shall show that this 
differs depending on whether or not  ˆ z  lies above or below  2 z . To do this, we first solve 
for  the  curve  where  2 ˆ z z = .  There  is  always  a  solution  to 
( ) ˆ ˆ ' min{ ( ), ( )} * '( ) '(0) h E u Z u z u u z u − = ,  (i.e.  ˆ z   is  interior  and  the  relevant  first-
order condition holds with equality) ; thus if   2 ˆ z z =  then  
  ( ) 3 2 3 2 ' ( ) '( ) '(0) h p z u u z u − = .  (***) 
 
   When (***) holds it implicitly defines a unique value of  3 ˆ p , with  2 ˆ z z >  for 
3 3 ˆ p p >  and   2 ˆ z z <  for  3 3 ˆ p p ≤  . If there is no solution to (***) then either   2 ˆ z z >  
for all  3 p , and we set  3 ˆ 0 p = , or  2 ˆ z z < for all  3 p , and we set  3 ˆ 1 p = . 
Consider the case  3 3 ˆ p p > ; here  since  2 2 ( ) u z z =  (**) becomes   22
  ( ) 3 3 ˆ ˆ ' ( ( ) ) '( ) '(0) h p u z u u z u − = . 
This is indeed independent of  1 p . Hence, in this region it holds that  1 ˆ / 0 p z p ∂ ∂ =  as 
asserted. When  3 3 ˆ p p <  we differentiate (**) with respect to  1 p  to find 
 
 
( ) 1 3 2 3 3
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ '' (1 )min{0, ( ) } min{0, ( ) } '( )
ˆ min{0, ( ) }
h p p u z z p u z u u z
u z z
− − − − + −
× −
 
This expression is negative for 2 ˆ z z > , hence ˆ z  decreasing in  1 p  in this case. 
￿ 
Now we discuss how these results imply that the approximate dual-self model can 
explain  behavior  such  as  the  Allais  paradox,  using  Figure  4  to  illustrate  the  ideas. 
Scenario  I in Allais-paradox experiments juxtaposes a lottery  s  with certain gain  2 z  
(located at the origin) with a risky lottery r  that has a positive return, so it lies above the 
risk neutral indifference curve (the thick line crossing s ). The data indicate that the latter 
tends to get rejected as too risky, so it has to lie below the actual indifference curve – the 
dashed line crossing s . In the figure the alternative Lottery r  lies to the upper right in 
between the two indifference curves; so indeed, Lottery s  will be preferred. 
Scenario  II  entails  reducing  the  probability,  for  both  lotteries,  of  the  middle 
outcome  2 z   and  adding  this  probability  to  outcome  1 0 z = .  This  holds  fixed  the 
probability of  3 z , so in the diagram it simply shifts both s  and r  the same distance to the 
right, resulting in the new lotteries  ' s  and  ' r . If the probability of  3 z  in Lottery s  is less 
than  3 ˆ p , shifting Lottery  s  to the right (to become  ' s ) causes the actual indifference 
curve  to  get  flatter.  Depending  on  the  exact  magnitude  of  the  change,  it  could  shift 
preference, so that  ' s  is now below  ' r  rather than above  ' r . Hence an Allais reversal can 
occur, with s  being chosen in Scenario I and the riskier alternative  ' r  being chosen in 
Scenario II. This case is the one illustrated in the figure. Note that this reversal would not 
be possible if the indifference lines were parallel as in the standard model. 
Our results show that if the probability of  3 z  was larger than  3 ˆ p  this reversal 
could not occur (but remember that for the Allais paradox the probability of  3 z  is in fact 
zero).  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  5,  where  the  lotteries  in  the  initial  scenario  have 
probability of the best outcome that exceeds  3 ˆ p . In this case, a mere shift of the lottery to   23
the right leads to a new lottery  ' s , whose indifference curve does not have a different 
slope than  ( ) I s , hence no reversal occurs.  
  
Figure 4. The Allais Paradox Reversal in the Approximate Model 
1 
 
                                        Increasing  
                                            Utility                       I(s)                                                                  Scenario I concerns the 
choice between s and r  
p3                                                                         Scenario II concerns the choice between s` and r`   
 
3 ˆ p   
   
               r                                      r`          I(s’) 
 
0   s                  p1                 s`                             1 
 
 
Figure 5. The High Expected Payoff Case with No Reversal 
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This shows the importance of the fact that in the Allais experiments there is a 
great  difference  in  the  short-run  expected  payoffs  across  the  two  scenarios.  It  is  the 
convexity in the self-control function that leads to reversals when the difference in these 
expected  payoffs  is  sufficiently  high.  Now  consider  the  common  ratio  paradox  as 
depicted in Figure 3.  In Scenario I the agent has a choice between a Lottery s  with a 
high probability  2 s  of winning outcome  2 z  (or else yields zero) and a more risky Lottery 
r , which has a certain chance   3 2 r s <  of winning 3 z  (or else zero). Again, the choice of 
s , which is observed in the data, corresponds to the case where lottery r  lies between the 
risk-neutral indifference curve and the actual (steeper) indifference curve crossing s . In 
Scenario II,  r  shifts down and to the right, while  s shifts to the right (notice that the 
vector from  s  to  r  gets shorter but continues to point in the same direction). If the 
indifference curve gets flatter there can again be a reversal.  
This time the reversal occurs whether or not  3 p  is smaller than 3 ˆ p , because not 
only does  1 p  get larger, but also  3 p  gets smaller and that always flattens the indifference 
curve. Note the implication here: this theory predicts that common ratio paradoxes hold 
for a wider variety of parameter values than common consequence, since the latter only 
occur  below 3 ˆ p .  The  reason  that  the  common  ratio  always  generates  reversals  in  the 
approximate  dual  self  model  is  that  the  short-run  payoffs  in  the  second  scenario  are 
always  a  fixed  fraction  of  the  payoffs  in  the  initial  scenario  (assuming  (0) 0 u = ), 
regardless of the position of the initial-scenario lotteries in the triangle. 
Finally we consider the issue of whether preferences are transitive. Transitivity 
holds  if  and  only  if  for  every  choice  of  lotteries  , p q   such  that  ( ) q I p ∈   we  have 
( ) ( ) I p I q = . We now show that this need not be true. So, fix a lottery  p and a lottery 
' ( ) q I p ∈  and recall that when  2 ˆ q z z >   the slope of  ( ) I p  at the point q p =  is given by  
  
2 2
3 2 3 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )/ '( ) ( )/ '( )
|
q q q p p p
q p
z z u z u z z z u z u z
z z z z
=




We would like to show that when h  is not linear the slope of  ( ') I q  at p is different from 
this.
18 Recall that  
 
                                                 
18 Notice that if p does not belong to  ( ') I q  there is nothing to prove.    25
( )
*
1 1 3 2 3 3 1
ˆ ( *, , )
ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) '(0)[(1 ) (1 ) ].
q q
q q
U u Z z
h q u z u u q q z q z q z
=
− − + − − + − −
 
Notice that the FOC for a maximum with respect to ˆ q z  is 
  ( )
*
1 ˆ ˆ ' (1 ) ( ) '( ) '(0) q q h q u z u u z u − − = . 
Let  ( ') u p  denote the short-run expected utility from a generic lottery  ' p . We may then 




ˆ ˆ ˆ '((1 ) ( ) ( )) ( )/ '(0) p p p z z h p u z u p u z u
z z
− + − −
−
. 
 Without loss of generality, consider the case where ( ') ( ) u q u p > . We are then interested 
in what  ( ') I q  looks like for lotteries  r  near  p, so we may assume ( ') ( ) u q u r > ; the 
indifference curve we are interested in is defined locally by the following relation: 
  ( )
( )
*
1 1 3 2 3 3 1
*
1 1 3 2 3 3 1
ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) '(0)[(1 ) (1 ) ]
ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) '(0)[(1 ) (1 ) ] 0.
q q
r r
G h q u z u u q q z q z q z
h r u z u u r r z r z r z
≡ − − + − − + − − −
− − + − − + − − =
 
We want to find  3 1 / dr dr  at r p = . Note that  * ( ') u u q =  is constant, and that we may 
ignore the dependence of  ˆr z  on r  by the envelope theorem as described above. Taking 
the derivatives of G  with respect to  1 r , 3 r  we have that: 
  ( )
*
1 1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ / ' (1 ) ( ) ( ) '(0)[ ] p r r dG dr h r u z u u z u z z = − − − + −  
  3 3 2 / '(0)[ ] dG dr u z z = −  
Accordingly,  the slope of the indifference curve  ( ') I q  at  r p =   is equal to: 
  ( ) 2 1
3 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ' (1 ) ( ) ( ') ( )/ '(0) p p p z z h p u z u q u z u
z z
− + − −
−
.  




ˆ ˆ ˆ '((1 ) ( ) ( )) ( )/ '(0) p p p z z h p u z u p u z u
z z
− + − −
−
. 
These are the same if and only if  
  1 1 ˆ ˆ '((1 ) ( ) ( ')) '((1 ) ( ) ( )) p p h p u z u q h p u z u p − − = − − .   26
But since  ( ') ( ) u q u p >  by assumption, this equation requires that  ' h  be locally constant. 
The “expected regret” models of Loomes and Sugden [1982] and Fishburn [1982] 
also generate intransitive preferences. Like the dual-self model, the key characteristic of 
these models is the dependence of preferences on the choice menu. Like our model, these 
models generate “indifference curves” that cross under certain assumptions; they can also 
explain the common ratio and common consequence effects.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
We have examined how the assumption of a linear long-run value function can 
lead to a more tractable model than the model of Fudenberg and Levine [2011], and we 
showed how this simplified model is useful in explaining choice among lotteries. The 
model  respects  stochastic  dominance,  and  for  lotteries  with  very  low  and  very  high 
possible  prizes,  lottery  choice  corresponds  to  the  maximization  of  short-run  expected 
utility and expected value, respectively. Restricting attention to the case of two lotteries 
with three outcomes, we show how the model can generate indifference curves that “fan 
out” and thus can explain the well-known Allais and common ratio paradoxes.   
As we have pointed out, models such as “expected regret” can capture the static 
risk-based anomalies that we have discussed here, and in addition generate the classic 
preference  reversal  phenomenon  and  other  paradoxes.  However,  the  general  dual-self 
model has a wider scope, in the sense that it is consistent with a large number of facts, 
across  different  domains.  In  particular,  the  model  has  predictions  about  time-related 
phenomena (such as preference reversals for delayed rewards), risk-related phenomena 
(such  as  the  ones  described  here),  contextual  psychological  phenomena  (such  as  the 
effect of cognitive load), etc. At the same time, the model is consistent with modern 
macroeconomic theory and evidence. In addition, the derivation of risk preference and 
reversals from an underlying model of self-control has implications about correlations 
between an individual’s choices between lotteries and her choices in other domains that 
are not present in alternative theories such as prospect theory. It also makes predictions 
that the same individual may make different choices between lotteries depending on other 
decision problems that have recently been faced. In effect the h  function is determined 
by past behavior and personal characteristics.   27
Psychological  evidence  indicates  that  self-control  depends  on  a  resource  that 
resembles “strength” or a “muscle” (Muraven, and Baumeister 1998, Baumeister et al. 
1998). In particular, repeated use of self-control within short time intervals depletes the 
“stock of willpower”, and rest is needed in order to for this stock to recover. Further, like 
a muscle, the ability to exercise self-control can be enlarged by repeatedly exercising it. 
This  time  dimension  in  self-control  is  analyzed  in  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [2012].  In 
particular an individual who has recently faced difficult self-control problems – and so 
depleted her stock of self-control – will exhibit a higher cost of self-control as measured 
by h . 
Second,  different  individuals  have  different  degrees  of  past  exercise  of  self-
control, and therefore different capacities of using it. There is some evidence that the 
ability  to  exercise  self-control  is  heterogeneous  and  correlated  with  such  positive 
outcomes as scholarly achievement, interpersonal skills, and less alcohol abuse (Tagney, 
Baumeister and Boone, 2004).  So for example we may expect individuals who have a 
history of addiction and alcohol abuse to have a higher cost of self-control as measured 
by h . Finally, as shown in O’ Donoghue and Rabin [1999] self-control costs implies an 
individual exhibits present bias. Hence we may expect individuals who exhibit greater 
present bias to have a higher cost of self-control as measured by h .  
Evidence  indicates  that  higher  cognitive  load,  by  reducing  the  psychological 
resources available for self-control, leads to higher self-control costs.
19 Like other things 
such as recent difficult self-control problems, an individual with a higher cognitive load 
will  exhibit  a  higher  h .  Cognitive  load  can  be  easily  controlled  in  the  laboratory, 
typically by selectively assigning memory tasks to different treatment groups. This means 
that  the  theory  implies  that  reversals  like  those  of  common  ratio  and  common 
consequence can be induced by increasing cognitive load.
20 
                                                 
19 For example, Shiv and Fedorikhin [1999] find that subjects who are under heavy cognitive load, having 
to remember a seven-digit number, tend to choose a - relatively unhealthy - chocolate cake dessert rather 
than a more healthy fruit salad. On the contrary, subjects who had to memorize a two-digit number tended 
to opt for the fruit salad more often. This indicates that higher cognitive load might have impaired subjects’ 
ability to exercise self-control.  
20 Note that there is some initial evidence of this, such as the results from the experiment of Benjamin, 
Brown and Shapiro [2006] who find that cognitive load tends to exacerbate small stakes risk aversion and –
to a lesser degree – short run impatience.    28
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